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Abstract 
Using structural equation modeling, we tested theoretical predictions concerning the effects of 
perceived discrimination against one’s gender on psychological well-being in women and men. Results 
were highly supportive of the rejection-identification model, with perceptions of discrimination 
harming psychological well-being among women, but not among men. Our results also support the 
rejection-identification model’s prediction that women partially cope with the negative well-being 
consequences of perceived discrimination by increasing identification with women as a group. In 
contrast, perceived discrimination was unrelated to group identification among men. We found no 
support for the hypothesis that perceptions of discrimination have self-protective properties among the 
disadvantaged. Results are consistent with our contention that the differential effects of perceived 
discrimination among women and men are due to differences in the groups’ relative positions within 
the social structure. 
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Perceiving Discrimination Against One’s Gender Group has Different Implications 
for Well-Being in Women and Men 
 What are the psychological consequences of perceiving prejudice and discrimination against 
one’s gender group? Because perceptions of discrimination can differ in meaning, there is no one 
answer to this question. One of the most important influences on the subjective meaning of 
perceptions of discrimination is the position of the targeted group within the social structure. In other 
words, the meaning and consequences of perceiving prejudice and discrimination against an ingroup 
will depend on whether the ingroup is privileged or disadvantaged within the existing social structure. 
We define privilege and disadvantage in relative terms. Compared to disadvantaged groups, privileged 
groups tend to receive more positive outcomes as a function of their group membership and hold more 
positions of power within the social structure. Based on the rejection-identification model 
(Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) we argue that perceptions of prejudice and discrimination will 
be more harmful for disadvantaged groups than for privileged groups. The model also predicts that 
disadvantaged groups counter some of the psychological costs of perceiving discrimination by 
increasing their identification with their disadvantaged group. We test these hypotheses about the 
effects of perceived discrimination among women and men–two groups that differ in their structural 
position. 
The Psychological Consequences of Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination 
 Although there is little disagreement among social psychologists that prejudice and 
discrimination are harmful to disadvantaged groups, there is less consensus about the psychological 
well-being consequences of perceiving oneself or one’s group as a victim of discrimination.  One 
perspective suggests that perceiving prejudice can be beneficial because it helps members of 
disadvantaged groups to discount the causal role of the self in bringing about negative outcomes 
(Crocker & Major, 1989). Another perspective suggests that perceiving discrimination is harmful to the 
psychological well-being of members of disadvantaged groups because it represents the realization that 
one’s ingroup is rejected by the majority, and that the ingroup’s life opportunities are limited in a way 
that others’ are not (Schmitt & Branscombe, in press-a). 
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 The Discounting Perspective.  The “discounting perspective” suggests that perceiving prejudice 
and discrimination against one’s group might have positive consequences for the psychological well-
being of disadvantaged groups. Crocker and Major (1989) argued that attributions to prejudice for 
negative outcomes can protect self-esteem and positive affect because they discount the role of one’s 
own behavior or performance as a cause of that outcome. By explaining the event in terms of another 
person’s prejudice, one can avoid blaming the self for the negative outcome. In support of this view, 
Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major (1991) found that women reported less depressed affect when they 
could attribute negative feedback to the evaluator’s sexism, compared to when an attribution to sexism 
was implausible. As stated by Crocker and Quinn (1998), “For people who are targets of prejudice and 
discrimination, knowing that one possible cause of negative outcomes is the prejudice of other people, 
rather than one’s own faults or shortcomings, may protect self-esteem” (p. 172). According to this 
perspective, perceptions of discrimination against one’s group are self-protective because they 
encourage individuals to explain their negative outcomes as being due to the prejudice of others. 
Crocker et al. (1991) write that “members of stigmatized groups who generally believe that they are 
discriminated against or that others are racist should be more likely to attribute negative feedback to 
prejudice and therefore may be higher in self-esteem” (p. 226; see also Crocker & Major, 1989, p. 621). 
 The discounting  hypothesis was originally framed in terms of making a single attribution to 
prejudice for a specific negative outcome.  However, as the above quotes indicate, this perspective has 
also been applied to more general beliefs about the extent of discrimination. We argue that if 
perceptions of prejudice do have self-protective properties, they would be most likely to occur in the 
conditions originally outlined by the discounting hypothesis, and least likely to apply to the extension of 
the hypothesis to general perceptions of prejudice and discrimination. If prejudice is seen as an isolated 
occurrence, it may be psychologically beneficial in the way that the discounting hypothesis suggests. 
Once perceptions of discrimination are generalized across situations, prejudice will be seen as more 
pervasive and stable. As we describe more fully below, perceiving discrimination generally is unlikely to 
be self-protective, and is likely to be harmful to well-being among disadvantaged groups. 
 Perceptions of discrimination in privileged and disadvantage groups. Understanding the 
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potential psychological costs or benefits of perceived discrimination first requires an exploration of 
how these perceptions differ for groups who are relatively privileged or disadvantaged in the social 
structure (Schmitt & Branscombe, in press-a). Empirical research has found that both privileged and 
disadvantaged groups alike are aware that some groups are treated less well than others, and agree that 
society imputes men and Whites higher status than women and ethnic minorities (Crocker & Major, 
1989; Eagly, 1987; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stewart, Vassar, Sanchez, & David, 2000). Because they 
occupy different positions in the social structure, disadvantaged and privileged groups’ perceptions of 
being the target of prejudice and discrimination are likely to differ in a number of ways. First, the kinds 
of events that privileged and disadvantaged groups attribute to prejudice are likely to differ in terms of 
their severity. Empirical research (Branscombe, 1998; Kappen, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Schmitt, 
2000; Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998) has demonstrated that the kinds of events women label as 
discriminatory (e.g. unequal pay, fear of sexual assault) are more severe than the kinds of events men 
label as discriminatory (e.g. having to pay when on dates, being more likely to get a speeding ticket). In 
addition, disadvantaged groups are likely to perceive prejudice against them as occurring across a wider 
variety of contexts than do privileged groups. Disadvantaged groups report encountering prejudice and 
discrimination across a wider variety of life contexts than do members of privileged groups, who report 
discrimination experiences that are relatively circumscribed (Branscombe, 1998). These studies suggest 
that for the disadvantaged, discrimination experiences are likely to be seen as relatively severe and stable 
occurrences rather than isolated or unusual events. Stable perceptions of prejudice and discrimination 
can create a sense of hopelessness and depression in disadvantaged groups (Brown, & Siegel, 1988; 
Golin, Sweeney, & Shaeffer, 1981; Robins, 1988; Weiner,1985). As Snyder (1994, p. 146) writes, 
perceiving prejudice against one’s group membership is “antithetical to the furtherance of hopeful 
thinking.” These are relatively less likely consequences of perceiving discrimination among privileged 
groups, because they are less likely to see prejudice against their group as a pervasive phenomenon. 
Such differential perceptions of the pervasiveness of discrimination will also lead privileged group 
members to see prejudice as relatively controllable; they are aware that the contexts where they might 
face discrimination are relatively infrequent and more easily avoided. In contrast, perceptions of 
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prejudice and discrimination among the disadvantaged are more likely to reduce feelings of control 
precisely because they discount one’s own role in controlling outcomes across as wider variety of 
situations (Major & Crocker, 1993). 
 Compared to privileged groups, members of disadvantaged groups are more likely to experience 
perceptions of discrimination as reflective of systematic devaluation and rejection by the dominant 
culture (Branscombe, Schmitt, et al., 1999). Many theoretical approaches predict that feeling devalued in 
this way will harm self-esteem (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and empirical 
research has supported the contention that such exclusion is harmful to psychological well-being 
(Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998; Frable, 1993; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Because privileged 
groups have the structural power to define who is and who is not accepted and valued in society, 
rejection by privileged groups implies that one's group is devalued in society as a whole. In contrast, 
when privileged group members are rejected by the disadvantaged, the immediate experience might be 
unpleasant, but it carries fewer implications for the ingroup’s value and status within the culture as a 
whole. Thus, because it is less likely to reflect devaluation of one's social identity in the dominant 
culture, perceptions of discrimination among privileged group members are less likely to harm 
psychological well-being than perceptions of discrimination among disadvantaged groups. To 
summarize, because perceived discrimination among disadvantaged groups reflects more pervasive 
discrimination and devaluation, we predict that they cause more harm to psychological well-being than 
in privileged groups. 
Empirical Evidence that Perceiving Prejudice is Harmful Among Disadvantaged Groups 
 A growing body of empirical work supports the idea that perceptions of discrimination are 
harmful to the psychological well-being of members of disadvantaged groups. The recognition that 
one’s group is disadvantaged is negatively related to psychological well-being among women 
(Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997; Klonoff, Landrine, & Campbell, 2000), Jews (Dion & Earn, 1975), 
African-Americans (Branscombe, Schmitt, et al., 1999; Cross & Strauss, 1998; Klonoff & Landrine, 
1999; Williams, Yu, Jackson, & Anderson, 1997), and gay men and lesbians (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 
1999). In a recent review, Clark, Anderson, Clark, and Williams (1999) concluded that perceived racism 
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among African Americans can even result in a number of long-term negative physical health effects. 
Perhaps in an attempt to avoid the psychological costs of perceiving discrimination, members of 
disadvantaged groups are reluctant to perceive the discrimination that confronts them, and tend to 
avoid attributing failure to discrimination unless provided with very strong evidence of discrimination 
(Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995, 1997). 
 Recent empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction that perceiving discrimination has 
different consequences for privileged and disadvantaged groups. Schmitt and Branscombe (in press-b) 
asked female and male undergraduates to consider a situation in which they were treated negatively by a 
professor, and manipulated whether the treatment was attributable to discrimination against their 
gender, or to the professor’s negative disposition toward everyone. Although women and men did not 
differ in affect when the professor treated everyone negatively, when the treatment was attributable to 
discrimination women felt reliably more negative affect than men.   
 If perceptions of discrimination harm psychological well-being in disadvantaged groups, but not 
privileged groups, one would expect that disadvantaged groups, but not privileged groups, would 
minimize the likelihood of discrimination against them. When Ruggiero and Major (1998) tested this 
hypothesis, it was confirmed. In their studies, members of both privileged and disadvantaged groups 
received negative feedback and were presented with different base-rates for the probability that their 
evaluator was biased against their group. Replicating the findings of Ruggiero and Taylor (1995, 1997), 
women and Blacks attributed their failure to prejudice more than to their own performance only when 
they were told that 100% of the raters were biased and discrimination was a virtual certainty. In all 
other conditions, women and Blacks attributed their failure to their own performance more than the 
prejudice of the raters. In contrast, men and Whites attributed their failure to prejudice more than to 
their own performance in all conditions except the condition where they were told explicitly that none 
of the raters were biased against them. 
Coping with the Harm of Perceiving Pervasive Prejudice 
If recognizing discrimination and prejudice does harm psychological well-being in members of 
disadvantaged groups, how then do the disadvantaged cope with this harm? According to social identity 
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theory, recognizing that the powerful majority is prejudiced and discriminates against one's ingroup will 
lead to an increase in identification with the minority ingroup (Tajfel, 1978). Building on this social 
identity framework, the rejection-identification model argues that experiencing rejection from the 
dominant culture in the form of pervasive prejudice leads disadvantaged groups to increase their 
identification with their minority group, which in turn alleviates some of the harm to psychological 
well-being. When acceptance and fair treatment by a more powerful group appears unlikely, 
psychologically investing more in one’s minority group is likely to have positive consequences for well-
being. In other words, when one experiences rejection from the dominant majority, one might 
increasingly turn toward the minority ingroup, which will in turn alleviate some of the harm to well-
being. Branscombe, Schmitt, et al.’s (1999) test of this model among African-Americans obtained 
strong support. Perceiving anti-Black prejudice across contexts was associated with increased African-
American identification, and this countered some of the direct negative effect of perceiving prejudice 
on well-being. 
 A number of empirical investigations support our claim that minority group identification is 
psychologically beneficial. Correlational research has found that minority group identification is 
associated with measures of psychological adjustment (Bat-Chava, 1994; Grossman, Wirt, & Davids, 
1985; Munford, 1994; Phinney, 1990; Rowley, Sellers, Chavous & Smith, 1998). Experimental work has 
confirmed that an awareness of one’s minority group membership can cause positive psychological 
outcomes. The mere presence of similarly stigmatized others raises self-esteem and lowers depression 
and anxiety (Frable, Pratt, & Hoey, 1998; McKenna & Bargh, 1998). Even more impressive is the 
finding that in a context in which they were likely to see themselves as disadvantaged, Black Americans 
who were reminded of their racial identity felt better than those who were not reminded (Major, 
Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). The link between group identification and well-being is 
not, however, limited to minority groups.  Empirical research suggests that identification with ingroup 
social categories is associated with positive well-being, regardless of the ingroup’s status (Branscombe 
& Wann, 1991).   
 In addition, research supports the prediction that perceiving discrimination encourages group 
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identification.  Recognizing prejudice and minority group identification are correlated among Jews 
(Rollins, 1973), women (Gurin & Townsend, 1986), African-Americans (Gurin, Gurin, Lao, & Beattie, 
1969), lesbians (Crosby et al., 1989), and non-mainstream college groups (e.g., punks, hippies, nerds; 
Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998). Using minimal groups, Ellemers (1993) found that when low status group 
members were led to believe that there is very little possibility they could achieve higher status as 
individuals, group identification was higher compared to when participants were led to believe that their 
group membership was less of a barrier to future success. Similarly, Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, and 
Spears (2001) found that people with body piercings who were told that they could expect prejudice 
and discrimination from the mainstream had higher levels of identification with other people with body 
piercings than those who were told that they could expect positive treatment.  More generally, Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, and Smith (1984) found that failure that threatens the status of the ingroup can increase 
ingroup cohesion and group identification. 
 Although the rejection-identification model specifically applies to disadvantaged groups, the 
theoretical perspective on which the model is based offers straightforward predictions about the effects 
of perceived discrimination in privileged groups. Because perceptions of discrimination among 
privileged groups are relatively less likely to reflect perceptions of pervasive discrimination, they are also 
less likely to have a harmful effect on psychological well-being. In addition, the rejection-identification 
perspective suggests that perceived discrimination in privileged groups is less likely to lead to increased 
identification with the privileged group membership. Because members of privileged groups who 
perceive discrimination are less likely to experience it as pervasive devaluation, they are less likely to 
respond to it by turning to the ingroup. In addition, members of privileged groups are not likely to see 
discrimination against them as a threat to their group as a whole, or more generally as an intergroup 
phenomenon. Thus, one important cause of increased ingroup identification–perceived threat to the 
group–is likely to be absent in privileged group’s perceptions of discrimination (Branscombe, Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999). In short, the rejection-identification perspective predicts that because 
prejudice against privileged groups does not reflect widespread rejection—as it is likely to be among the 
disadvantaged—perceiving discrimination is relatively unlikely to harm the well-being of privileged 
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groups, or increase their group identification. 
Overview of the Current Study 
 We test predictions made by the rejection-identification model for both disadvantaged and 
privileged groups by examining the effects of perceiving gender discrimination among women and men. 
Although Branscombe, Schmitt, et al. (1999) found support for the rejection-identification model with 
African-Americans, the model’s differential predictions for disadvantaged and privileged groups have 
not been tested in prior research. Because the logic of the rejection-identification model is that the 
consequences of perceived discrimination depend on the social structural position of the ingroup, it is 
important to empirically test the model’s differing predictions for privileged and disadvantaged groups. 
We chose men and women as our comparison groups for two reasons. First, there is clear evidence that 
women are disadvantaged relative to men on virtually every known economic indicator (Peterson & 
Runyan, 1993). In the United States specifically, women are disadvantaged relative to men in terms of 
education (Orenstein, 1994; Sadker, 1994), income (Kemp, 1994; Olson & Frieze, 1987; Reskin & 
Padavic, 1994), and job promotion (Gupta, Jenkins, & Beehr, 1983; Stroh, Brett, & Reilly, 1992). 
Secondly, while women are disadvantaged, they do not represent a numerical minority, allowing our test 
of the model with this group to rule out size as the source of the effects. We also expanded on prior 
research by including a number of well-validated measures of psychological adjustment in order to 
consider psychological well-being more broadly. 
 We tested the following predictions derived from the rejection-identification model using 
structural equation modeling. Among women, we expected that perceiving discrimination against their 
gender group would exert a direct negative effect on psychological well-being, while simultaneously 
inducing coping via gender group identification. Among men, perceiving discrimination should not 
significantly affect well-being or gender group identification, although gender group identification 
should be related to well-being. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 Undergraduates (220 females, 203 males) completed a questionnaire for course credit in an 
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introductory psychology course. The average age of participants was 18.82 years (SD = 2.25); however, 
the men in the sample (M = 19.27, SD = 2.96) were significantly older than the women (M = 18.40, SD 
=1.13), F(1,421) = 16.39, p < .001. Participants completed the questionnaire booklets in mixed-gender 
groups of 10-30 people. The order of the measures was randomized across participants. The data from 
21 ethnic minority participants were excluded from the analysis. 
Measures of Perceptions of Discrimination 
 Ingroup disadvantage. We measured perceptions of the disadvantages faced by one’s gender 
group by averaging responses to four items (“Women [men] as a group have been victimized by 
society,” “Women [men] as a group regularly encounter sexism,” “Prejudice and discrimination against 
women [men] exists,” and “Women [men] as a group have been victimized because of their gender”). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each statement using a 1-8 (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) response scale. The measure was reliable overall (α = .83), and for both women (α= .77) and 
men (α= .69). For this and other measures of perceptions of inequality, higher numbers indicate more 
discrimination against one’s gender group. 
 Outgroup privilege. We created a measure of perceptions of one’s gender group’s privileges by 
averaging responses to five items (“Men [women] in general have had opportunities that they wouldn’t 
have gotten if they were women [men],” “There are privileges that men [women] have had that they 
would not have received if they weren’t men [women],” “Men [women] have received some kinds of 
advantages due to their gender,” “Good things have happened to men [women] because of their 
gender,” and “Men [women] have received preferential treatment because of their gender”). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each statement using a 1-8 (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree”) response scale. The measure was reliable overall (α = .83), and for both women (α = .85) and 
men (α = .77) 
 Past experience with gender discrimination. We measured attributions to prejudice for past 
negative outcomes with six items (“I have personally been a victim of sexual discrimination,” “I 
consider myself a person who has been deprived of opportunities because of my gender,” “I feel like I 
am personally a victim of society because of my gender,” “I have personally been the victim of sexual 
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harassment,” “I regularly encounter sexism against my gender,” and “Prejudice against my gender 
group has affected me personally”). Participants reported their level of agreement with each item on a 
1-8 scale (“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). This measure was reliable overall (α = .82), and for 
both women (α = .81) and men (α = .77). 
 Prejudice across contexts. This measure assesses the extent to which participants believe that 
negative outcomes, across a number of contexts, might be due to prejudice against their gender. We 
constructed a scale describing six negative outcomes that were attributionally ambiguous but that could 
be plausibly interpreted as situations where gender prejudice might operate: 1) Suppose you apply for a 
job that you believe you are qualified for. After the interview you learn that you didn’t get the job; 2) 
Suppose you want to join an organization whose members are mostly of the other gender. You are told 
that they are not taking any new members at this time; 3) After class you approach the professor to ask 
a question about the lecture, but the professor abruptly ends your conversation and begins talking with 
a student of the other gender; 4) You are assigned to a group of six students in order to complete a 
project. You are the only member of your gender in the group. The other members of the group are 
not very friendly and don’t pay much attention to what you have to contribute to the project; 5) You 
are having a conversation with a group of individuals, all members of the other gender. They laugh at 
everything you say, even though you are not trying to be funny; 6) You repeatedly ask your teaching 
assistant to help you prepare for the upcoming test. This teaching assistant seems to be more helpful to 
students of the other gender. Participants were asked to indicate how likely they would be to attribute 
each outcome to gender prejudice or to other causes, if that event happened to them. Participants 
responded to each event by circling a probability from 0% to 100%, with 5% increments. The measure 
was reliable overall (α = .83), and for both women (α= .85) and men (α= .79). 
Gender Group Identification 
 We assessed gender group identification with four items measuring emotional attachment to 
one’s gender group (“I value being a member of my gender group,” “I am proud to be a member of my 
gender group,” “I like being a member of my gender group,” and “I believe that being a member of my 
gender group is a positive experience”). Participants responded on a 1-8 scale (“Strongly Disagree” to 
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“Strongly Agree”), with higher scores indicating greater identification with one’s gender group. This 
measure was reliable overall (α = .85), and for both women (α = .89) and men (α = .81).  
Psychological Well-being 
 Self-esteem. We assessed self-esteem using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (1979), a 
well-validated measure of global self-esteem. Participants responded to the items on a 1-7 scale 
(“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”). Responses were reverse-scored where appropriate such that 
higher scores indicate higher personal self-esteem. The measure was reliable overall (α = .77), and for 
both women (α = .80) and men (α = .74). 
 Positive affect. We measured positive affect by asking participants how often they experience 
six positive emotions (Optimistic, Enthusiastic, Good Natured, Happy, Upbeat, and Satisfied). 
Participants responded on a 1-7 scale (“Never or almost never true of me” to “Always or almost always 
true of me”). This measure was reliable overall (α = .89), and for both women (α = .90) and men (α = 
.88). 
 Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was assessed by averaging responses to three items (“I am 
pleased with my accomplishments in life,” “Although some parts of my life could be improved, overall, 
I have no complaints,” and “I am satisfied with my life”). Participants responded on a 1-8 scale 
(“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”), with higher scores indicating greater satisfaction with one’s 
life. This measure was reliable overall (α = .86), and for both women (α = .84) and men (α = .87). 
 Depression. We measured depression using the short form of the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh,1961). For twenty sets of four statements, participants 
indicated which one of the four best describe them. Each statement was given a value from 0 to 3, with 
higher numbers being more diagnostic of depression. The total score was created by summing the 
scores for the 20 individual items. This measure was reliable overall (α = .89), and for both women (α 
= .88) and men (α = .90). 
 Anxiety. We measured anxiety using the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Inventory (Taylor, 1953). 
Participants indicated whether each of 20 statements was true or false of them. The total score 
consisted of the sum of responses that indicated anxiety. This measure was reliable overall (α = .82), 
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and for both women (α = .81) and men (α = .83). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 We first compared the scores of women and men on all of the measured variables. Because the 
men in the sample were significantly older than the women (although the difference was less than one 
year), we performed an analysis of covariance for each comparison, using age as a covariate. As shown 
in Table 1, women clearly reported experiencing more discrimination against their gender group than 
did men. Women reported greater ingroup disadvantage, greater outgroup privilege, more attributions 
to prejudice across contexts, and more past experience with gender discrimination, than did men. This 
difference suggests that women and men are sensitive to the social reality of women’s disadvantage 
relative to men. Women’s higher reports of past experience with discrimination and plausibility of 
situations across contexts reflect the reality that they do face prejudice more pervasively than men do.  
Women tended to report higher levels of gender group identification compared to men, but this 
difference was marginally significant. On the measures of well-being, women generally reported less 
positive well-being than men. This difference was significant on the Beck Depression Inventory and the 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Inventory measure, and marginal on the Rosenberg Personal Self-Esteem 
Inventory. The one reversal in the pattern of women scoring more negatively on the measures of 
psychological well-being occurred with the measure of frequency of experiencing positive emotions, 
where women reported significantly greater frequency than men. Men and women did not differ in 
general life satisfaction. 
Structural Equation Modeling Analyses Testing the Rejection-Identification Model 
 We tested the rejection-identification model among men and women using EQS for Windows 
Version 5.7b. For each model we tested, we report several indices of fit. We report the Non-Normative 
Fit Index (NNFI), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Chi-square goodness-of-fit index. Both the 
NNFI and CFI indicate the degree to which the model in question is superior to a null model, which 
specifies no covariances between the variables. These metrics can range from 0 to 1, with higher 
numbers indicating a better fit between the observed and estimated covariance matrices. Values greater 
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than .90 are generally considered to represent adequate fit of the model to the data (see Hu & Bentler, 
1995, for a more detailed discussion of fit indices). For the chi-square goodness-of-fit index, exact fit 
between the model and the data is represented by a chi-square value of zero, and higher chi-square 
values indicate worse fit. The goodness-of-fit index is extremely useful because it can be used to test 
whether removing or adding paths in a model results in a significant difference in goodness-of-fit.  
 Although fit indices are a measure of the extent to which the observed data can be reproduced 
by the hypothesized model, they are not the only criteria by which the adequacy of models can be 
evaluated. For example, models can fit the data well even when hypothesized paths in the model do not 
reach statistical significance, or are in the opposite direction than what was hypothesized. Thus, for 
each model we also consider the significance and valence of the model’s hypothesized causal 
relationships. Listwise deletion was used to compute the correlation matrices for men and women, as 
shown in Table 2. 
 The “Rejection-Identification Model” predicts that greater perceptions of pervasive prejudice 
against one’s own group will exert a direct negative effect on psychological well-being, and an indirect 
positive effect on well-being mediated by group identification. In other words, in addition to a direct 
negative effect on well-being, perceptions of discrimination against one’s group will increase group 
identification, and group identification will enhance psychological well-being. To test these 
hypothesized predictions, we specified a model where perceptions of ingroup disadvantage, outgroup 
privilege, prejudice against one’s gender across situations, and past experience with prejudice loaded on 
a single latent factor. Gender group identification was specified as a latent factor, with the four items of 
the measure serving as indicators. The measures of psychological well-being all served as indicators of a 
single latent factor. In addition, we specified that the latent factor of group identification was a function 
of perceptions of gender discrimination, and that psychological well-being was a function of both 
perceptions of discrimination and gender group identification. 
 Because the rejection-identification model assumes that the effects of perceived discrimination 
are different for disadvantaged and privileged groups, we predicted that the model would fit differently 
for women and men. Thus, we first had to test whether the model fit the observed data significantly 
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better when the model parameters were optimized separately for women and men, compared to when 
the model parameters were constrained to be equal across the two gender groups. Indeed, the 
combined fit of the model among both men and women was significantly worse when the free 
parameters were constrained to be equal across both gender groups compared to when the model was 
optimized separately for each group, ∆X2 (29) = 198.26, p < .001. Consequently, all subsequent 
analyses were carried out separately for men and women. 
 Women. We began our analyses of the women’s data by first testing an independence (or null) 
model, in which all of the parameters are set to zero. This model tests the assumption that there is no 
covariation among the variables in the model, and is used to establish a baseline against which to 
compare other models. The hypothesized model fit the data well, NNFI = .93, CFI = .94, and 
significantly better than the null model, ∆X 2(16) = 1070.55, p < .001. As shown in Figure 1, all of the 
estimated parameters were significant and in the direction consistent with our predictions, p’s < .05. In 
addition, all of the indicators significantly loaded on their respective latent factors, p’s < .05. Because 
the critical difference in our predictions for men and women is that perceived discrimination affects 
well-being and group identification in women but not in men, we examined how fixing these paths to 
zero would affect model fit. Among women, fixing both of these paths from perceived discrimination 
to zero resulted in a significant reduction in model fit, ∆X 2 (2) = 8.29, p < .01. In sum, the rejection-
identification model was supported among women. Results supported a model in which perceptions of 
gender discrimination exerted a significant negative effect on psychological well-being, and in which the 
negative effect of perceived discrimination was partially suppressed by increased ingroup identification. 
 The standardized total effect (both direct and indirect) of perceptions of discrimination on 
psychological well-being is -.15. Although our results are consistent with the idea that gender group 
identification partially alleviates the negative psychological effects of attributions to prejudice, the 
overall relationship between perceptions of discrimination and the well-being constructs was still 
negative. 
 Men. We hypothesized that gender group identification would positively predict psychological 
well-being in men, but perceived discrimination against men would not have significant effects on 
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either gender group identification or psychological well-being. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, we examined 
a model in which group identification affected psychological well-being, but the paths from perceived 
discrimination were fixed at zero. In examining this model’s fit, we again compared the hypothesized 
model to the null model. The hypothesized model fit the data well, NNFI = .89, CFI = .91, and 
significantly better that the null model, ∆X 2 (14) = 645.20, p < .001. All of the indicators significantly 
loaded on their respective latent factors (p’s < .05) with one exception. Unlike in the women’s data, the 
latent factor of perceived gender discrimination did not significantly predict scores on the measure of 
expectations of discrimination across situations. This finding suggests that for men, general beliefs 
about discrimination are unrelated to the plausibility of encountering discrimination across contexts.  
As predicted, the path from group identification to psychological well-being was positive and 
significant, p < .05. Freeing the paths from perceived discrimination to gender group identification and 
psychological well-being (allowing the paths to differ from zero when optimizing the estimated model 
to best fit the data) did not result in a significant increase in model fit among men, ∆X 2 (2) = 0.58, ns. 
To summarize, the results of these analyses are consistent with our predicted model for men, where 
perceived discrimination neither harms well-being nor encourages group identification. 
Tests of the discounting model 
 We tested an alternative theoretical model, based on the prediction that perceived 
discrimination can protect self-esteem by consistently serving as external attributions that discount 
one’s own causal role in a broad spectrum of negative outcomes (Crocker & Major, 1989). The 
discounting model predicts that perceptions of discrimination will protect the self-esteem of members 
of stigmatized groups because they allow for consistently making attributions to prejudice for negative 
outcomes (see also Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). In addition, the discounting perspective suggests 
that those high in group identification are more likely to use attributions to prejudice as a way of 
protecting self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1998). 
 We tested these predictions by examining a model for women in which group identification 
predicted perceptions of discrimination and psychological well-being, and perceptions of discrimination 
predicted well-being. (In testing this model for men, the only significant relationship that we found 
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among the latent factors was between gender group identification and psychological well-being. Thus, 
further reports of the analyses of the men’s data do not add anything to the results reported above. We 
therefore present only the results for women.) While this model fit well, NNFI = .93, CFI = .94, the 
standardized path weight for the path from perceptions of discrimination to psychological well-being 
was significantly negative (-.18, p < .05), not positive as would by predicted by the discounting model. 
Thus, this analysis disconfirms the hypothesis that perceiving discrimination exerts a direct positive 
effect on well-being. The standardized path weights for the paths from group identification to well-
being (.20) and from group identification to perceptions of discrimination (.17) were both significant, 
p’s < .05. However, because the relationship between perceived discrimination and psychological well-
being is negative, these results fail to support the discounting model. In a further test of the discounting 
model, we retested the model as specified above, but removed the direct path from group identification 
to well-being. This second model fit well, NNFI = .93, CFI = .94. The effect of group identification on 
perceived discrimination (.16) was significant, p < .05; however, the effect of perceived discrimination 
on well-being (-.13) was negative and non-significant, p > .10. Thus, these results are also inconsistent 
with the discounting model. 
Discussion 
 In this study we tested the idea that the psychological consequences of perceiving prejudice and 
discrimination against an ingroup depends on who is doing the perceiving. More specifically, we 
hypothesized that while members of a disadvantaged group would suffer psychological harm from 
perceiving discrimination, members of a privileged group would not. Indeed, among women we found 
support for a model in which perceptions of discrimination were associated with harmful 
consequences, but among men we found support for a model in which perceptions of discrimination 
were not associated with harmful consequences. These findings support the idea that attributions to 
prejudice are especially harmful among members of disadvantaged groups, but they are not harmful to 
members of privileged groups. More generally, our work is consistent with a growing body of research 
demonstrating that recognizing that one’s group membership is a target of prejudice and discrimination 
carries negative psychological consequences for disadvantaged groups (see Schmitt & Branscombe, in 
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press-a). 
 The rejection-identification model bases its predictions on the relatively pervasive nature of 
prejudice that disadvantaged groups must face. Because of their structural position, disadvantaged 
groups are more likely face and perceive discrimination and prejudice frequently and across contexts. In 
contrast, perceptions of discrimination among privileged groups are less likely to reflect perceptions of 
pervasive discrimination. Indeed, we found that women reported more personal experience with 
discrimination, and perceived more disadvantages and fewer privileges for their group than did men. 
Women were also more likely than men to see discrimination as a plausible explanation for future 
hypothetical negative events.  Although a measure of attributions to prejudice for ambiguous events is 
not a direct measure of the stability of attributions to prejudice across time, the gender difference in the 
perceived plausibility of attributions to prejudice does reflect differential stability of perceptions of 
discrimination across contexts. In our view, prejudice is seen as a plausible explanation for ambiguous 
negative events precisely because prejudice and discrimination are seen as likely occurrences across 
contexts. Thus, the effect of perceiving prejudice will differ for disadvantaged and privileged groups 
because the meaning of those perceptions differ for those groups. As evidence of this, we found that 
among men, attributions to prejudice for hypothetical situations did not significantly load on the latent 
factor of perceptions of discrimination. However, this measure significantly loaded on the latent factor 
among women. Examination of the correlation matrix in Table 2 makes it is clear that claims of gender 
discrimination among men are uncorrelated with the degree to which men explained hypothetical 
negative events as being due to discrimination. In women, attributions for these hypothetical situations 
were significantly correlated with the other three measures of gender discrimination, indicating that 
women perceived gender discrimination as something that could explain their outcomes across a 
number of specific situations. 
 As in previous work by Branscombe, Schmitt, et al. (1999), we found no support for the 
discounting hypothesis. According to Crocker and Major (1989), the more members of disadvantaged 
groups perceive prejudice and discrimination as widespread phenomena, the more frequently they will 
attribute negative outcomes to prejudice, and consequently, the higher their self-esteem may be. Based 
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on these predictions, we tested a "discounting model" among women and found that it failed to 
confirm the hypotheses suggested by the discounting perspective. In fitting the model to the data, 
optimal fit was achieved when perceived discrimination had a negative effect on well-being. Although 
our results are consistent with the notion that perceiving discrimination is more likely to have negative 
than positive consequences when discrimination is seen as pervasive, we did not test the possibility that 
they might offer some self-protection when they discount one's personal deservingness as a cause of a 
specific negative event. In contrast to our finding that general perceptions of discrimination are 
associated negatively with well-being, Crocker et al. (1991) found that women who could attribute a 
specific negative evaluation to the evaluator’s sexism reported less depressed affect than those for 
whom an attribution to prejudice was not plausible (but see Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997; Ruggiero & 
Major, 1998). If there are conditions where making an attribution to prejudice might be self-protective, 
it would seem to be limited to instances of discrimination that are seen as isolated or unusual. However, 
as a long term strategy of self-protection, attributions to prejudice are unlikely to be successful. If 
attributions to prejudice are made repeatedly, they are bound to increase general perceptions of 
discrimination, which we found to be harmful in women. 
 The present study advances research on perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a 
number of ways. First, we measured psychological well-being using a number of well-validated 
measures. Previous research in this area has focused on self-esteem and affective responses to a specific 
event. In contrast, our study examined mental health more generally, and how it is influenced by 
perceptions of discrimination more generally. In addition to the measures of self-esteem and affect, we 
included measures of depression, anxiety and life satisfaction. 
 Secondly, incorporating group identification into our model adds to a growing literature on the 
ways in which disadvantaged groups cope with the psychological costs of perceiving discrimination 
against them (e.g., Clark et al., 1999; Miller & Major, 2000). Rather than simply arguing that recognizing 
discrimination is harmful to psychological well-being, we have identified one important strategy for 
coping with that harm–group identification. Among women, we found that perceptions of 
discrimination increased gender group identification, and that gender group identification enhanced 
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well-being. Although the overall effect of perceiving discrimination was negative, increased group 
identification helped to attenuate some of the negative effects of those perceptions. Not only have we 
replicated previous findings obtained with African Americans (Branscombe, Schmitt, et al., 1999), but 
we simultaneously tested the rejection-identification model’s predictions among privileged and 
disadvantaged groups. Our perspective’s predictions for both groups were confirmed. 
Limitations 
 Although our results are highly consistent with the rejection-identification model, our data are 
correlational in nature, and other causal explanations for our findings cannot be disconfirmed 
empirically.  For instance, one explanation for the relationship we observed between perceived 
discrimination and well-being is that people who are not fairing well psychologically are more likely to 
perceive prejudice against them.  However, we observed the negative relationship between well-being 
and perceived discrimination exclusively among women. Therefore, while the maladjustment 
perspective might offer a plausible alternative explanation for our results for women, it cannot account 
for the different patterns of results among men and women.  It is not clear why maladjustment would 
encourage perceptions of discrimination among women, but not among men. Similarly, others have 
argued that the relationship between perceived discrimination and gender group identification that we 
observed among women is due to identification encouraging perceptions of discrimination. Once again, 
however, it is not clear why gender group identification would lead to perceptions of discrimination 
among women, but not men. Only the rejection-identification model’s differential predictions for 
privileged and disadvantaged groups offer a clear explanation for the different relationships observed 
for men and women. 
More importantly, when researchers have manipulated perceptions of discrimination in 
disadvantaged groups, they have found results consistent with our model. Using experimental methods, 
others have found that perceptions of discrimination increase group identification (Abelson, Dasgupta, 
Park, & Banaji, 1998; Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Dion, Earn, & Yee, 1978; Foster & Matheson, 1999; Hogg 
& Turner, 1987; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Simon et al., 1998), and harm well-being 
(Dion & Earn, 1975; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997). Although our data are correlational, we predicted and 
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found a different pattern of correlations among women and men. Furthermore, we tested an alternative 
theoretical model that specifies a different set of causal relationships, and found no support for that 
model. When testing the discounting model, we found that the model fit best when perceptions of 
discrimination negatively predicted well-being–the opposite of the effect predicted by that perspective. 
 Another limitation of the current findings concerns the measurement of the variables used in 
our tested models.  For some of the measures of perceived discrimination, the reliability for men was 
slightly lower than that for women.  However, by forming a latent factor out of these indicators, 
essentially comprised of the variance that the indicators have in common, we were able to reduce the 
influence of measurement error.  In addition, our measures of perceived discrimination were not 
balanced scales (none of the items were reverse-scored), which could potentially introduce a response 
bias.  However, such a response bias could not easily account for the differential findings we observed 
among women and men.  Thus, although these measurement issues cannot offer a clear explanation for 
our findings, future replications using different and improved measures of the conceptual variables 
would strengthen the generalizability of this work.  
Future Directions 
  Because our perspective makes its predictions based on the ingroup’s social structural position, 
it has interesting implications for future research on the factors that encourage or discourage social 
structural change. Clearly, before members of disadvantaged groups can engage in collective action 
aimed at reducing inequality, they must first acknowledge that discrimination exists. In that sense, 
recognizing discrimination against one’s disadvantaged group may be positive rather than negative. 
Thus, a discontinuity may exist between what is good for psychological well-being at the individual level 
(the focus of our investigation), and what might be necessary to bring about positive social change for 
the group as a whole. In other words, while recognition of disadvantage is necessary for disadvantaged 
groups to organize for change, it is a recognition that individual members tend to avoid because it is a 
psychologically harmful realization. Indeed, in women’s history, the suffrage movement and feminist 
movements were not uniformly endorsed by the women who eventually benefited from them (Faludi, 
1991). In a study of antifeminist literature, Kinnard (1986) found that half of the books denouncing 
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women's rights were written by women. According to our perspective, at least part of the reason why 
women have been reluctant to join women’s rights movements is that the recognition that they are 
disadvantaged is harmful to the individual’s psychological well-being. 
 Because the negative well-being consequences of recognizing disadvantage are somewhat 
alleviated by identification with one’s group, perceptions of discrimination will be most harmful when 
structural or contextual factors “block” the possibility of identification with one’s group. According to 
social identity theory, when discrimination is seen as legitimate, targets of discrimination are unlikely to 
turn toward their ingroup (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Tajfel, 1978). Thus, ideologies 
that legitimize inequality are likely to make the recognition of disadvantage more harmful by 
discouraging group identification. Indeed, when prejudice is seen as legitimate, perceiving 
discrimination is especially harmful (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1994; Quinn & Crocker, 1999). In the 
case of women, biological essentialism is likely to be a common and powerful justification for 
patriarchy (Bem, 1993). Our understanding of the  psychological experience of disadvantaged groups 
could benefit from future research investigating the role of such ideologies in moderating the likelihood 
of group identification as a response to perceptions of disadvantage. 
 For the men in our sample, claims of discrimination were unrelated to group identification and 
well-being. What then do such claims actually mean to the men who make them? Although this 
question cannot be fully answered by our data, other research offers a few suggestions. For instance, 
Kobrynowicz and Branscombe (1997) suggested that attributions to prejudice among men might be the 
result of intragroup comparisons with the past, rather than intergroup comparisons. In other words, 
they result from men comparing their current outcomes to those of men in the past, and perceiving 
their current position as less positive. In that sense, claims of discrimination among men might be 
experienced as less of an intergroup phenomenon than it is among women. Our own observation that 
men’s perceptions of discrimination were unrelated to group identification is consistent with the idea 
that men perceive discrimination more in interpersonal than intergroup terms. 
Conclusions 
 We found that women’s perceptions of discrimination were negatively related to a number of 
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major markers of psychological well-being. Our results were consistent with the rejection-identification 
model, which suggests that in women, perceptions of discrimination lead to negative psychological 
well-being. Our results also support the hypothesis that increased gender group identification alleviates 
some of the negative psychological effects. Among men, claims of discrimination did not predict well-
being or group identification. These differential findings for women and men are clearly supportive of 
the idea that because women and men occupy different positions within the social structure, 
perceptions of discrimination mean something very different to women than they do to men. Future 
work on perceptions of discrimination, and on perceptions of the social structure more generally, 
should consider how the effects of such perceptions have different implications depending on the 
ingroup’s social structural position. 
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Table 1 
Means and standard deviations for the measured variables among women and men 
 
Measure Women Men F(1, 421) 
Ingroup Disadvantage 6.16 (1.39) 3.85 (1.54) 252.62, p < .001 
Outgroup Privilege 6.33 (1.28) 5.38 (1.37) 51.91, p < .001 
Prejudice across Contexts 62.60 (19.96) 54.03 (20.19) 18.29, p < .001 
Past Prejudice Experience 3.70 (1.75) 2.36 (1.36) 76.00, p < .001 
Gender Group Identification 6.97 (.98) 6.77 (1.11) 3.84, p < .06 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem 5.24 (1.33) 5.40 (1.63) 3.47, p < .07 
Life Satisfaction 6.49 (.91) 6.30 (.85) 1.65, ns 
Positive Affect  5.88 (.93) 5.67 (1.00) 4.63, p < .05 
Beck Depression 7.71 (6.90) 6.08 (7.36) 5.35, p < .05 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety 9.35 (4.43) 8.27 (4.73) 5.70, p < .05 
Note. Both F’s and means are adjusted for age.  Age was a significant covariate for the measures of 
outgroup privilege, past experience with prejudice, and gender group identification, p’s < .05.  Age had 
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Table 2 
Correlations and Standard Deviations for the Measured Variables Among Women and Men 
 
Variable              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Ingroup Disadvantage              — .39* .02 .53* .06 -.02 -.02 .07 .11 .01 -.04 .11 -.05
2. Outgroup Privilege             
               
              
              
              
              
        
           
              
.47* — .09 .26* .22* .15* .11 .20* .07 -.06 -.14* .02 .06
3. Prejudice across Contexts .20* .27* — .02 .03 .03 -.03 .03 .04 -.11 .00 .09 .19*
4. Past Prejudice Experience .47* .36* .29* — -.04 -.13 -.20* -.10 -.08 -.19* -.14* .23* .13 
5. Like .10 .17* .07 .05 — .66* .66* .45* .22* .10 .11 -.05 .03
6. Value .01 .06 .03 -.08 .74* — .51* .49* .20* .21* .21* -.08 -.06
7. Pride .08 .23* .06 .09 .72* .63* — .50* .23* .22* .22* -.07 -.06
8. Positive .16* .27* .04 -.01 .67* .59* .65* — .26* .19* .19* -.05 -.13
9. Rosenberg Self-Esteem -.01 -.03 -.14* -.14* .14* .20* .13* .19* — .48* .47* -.38* -.35*
10. Life Satisfaction -.04 .00 -.07 -.10 .11 .13* .12 .12 .70* — .46* -.50* -.56* 
11. Positive Affect  -.06 -.06 -.11 -.18* .09 .15* .08 .17* .57* .50* — -.24* -.30* 
12. Beck Depression .06 .04 .25* .13* .03 .08 .02 .00 -.45* -.52* -.36* — .47*
13. Taylor Manifest Anxiety .14* .05 .12 .15* -.08 -.07 -.10 -.12 -.46* -.65* -.42* .53* — 
Men Standard Deviation 1.54 1.37 20.2 1.36 1.41 1.13 1.53 1.50 1.63 .85 1.00 7.36 4.73
Women Standard Deviation              1.39 1.28 20.0 1.75 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.26 1.33 .91 .93 6.90 4.43
 
Note. The correlations for women (N = 220) are below the diagonal of the matrix; the correlations for men (N = 203) are above the diagonal. 
* p < .05 
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Figure 1. The Rejection-Identification Model and estimated parameters among women. All of the estimated path weights are standardized. * p 
< .05. 
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Figure 2. The Rejection-Identification Model and estimated parameters among men. All of the estimated path weights are standardized. * p < 
.05. 
